We investigate Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) relaying models. Firstly, we propose a novel quasi-trusted QKD relaying model. The quasi-trusted relays are defined as follows: (i) being honest enough to correctly follow a given multi-party finite-time communication protocol; (ii) however, being under the monitoring of eavesdroppers. We develop a simple 3-party quasi-trusted model, called Quantum Quasi-Trusted Bridge (QQTB) model, to show that we could securely extend up to two times the limited range of single-photon based QKD schemes. We also develop the Quantum Quasi-Trusted Relay (QQTR) model to show that we could securely distribute QKD keys over arbitrarily long distances. The QQTR model requires EPR pair sources, but does not use entanglement swapping and entanglement purification schemes as proposed in 1,2,3 . Secondly, we show that our quasi-trusted models could be improved to become untrusted models in which the security is not compromised even though attackers have full controls over some relaying nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The limited range of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) link is one of the most headachequestions to many researchers for a long time. The earliest QKD protocol 4 is the BB84
protocol that had been proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 . After, this protocol was proven to be unconditionally secure 5, 6, 7, 8 , and promised the vast potentially worthful applications. As the cost due of its extremely good security, unfortunately, QKD owns undesirable restrictions over range and rate 9, 10 . This explains why there are few practical QKD applications so far. Today, improving QKD range's approaches can be roughly divided into two categories. The first one is improvements over direct QKD links, for instance, perfecting quantum devices as quantum sources and quantum detectors. The second one is QKD relaying methods that allow to securely relay QKD keys. This paper addresses the latter one. We will assume that we work with perfect quantum devices, free-error quantum channels to focus on the "relaying" aspect.
Our main contributions are :
1. The proposal of a new concept called "quasi-trusted relay" that seems reasonable in The remainder is organized as follows. Section II gives an overview of previous works on QKD relaying models and introduces our motivation. Section III reminds some background concept and also makes some propositions that are used in our proposed models. We define our "quantum quasi-trusted" concept in Section IV. Section V develops the Quantum QuasiTrusted Bridge (QQTB) model that is capable of securely doubling the range of single-photon based QKD schemes. Section VI develops the Quantum-Trusted Relay (QQTR) model that is capable of securely distributing shared keys over arbitrarily long distances. Section VII develops the Quantum Untrusted Bridge (QUB) model that is capable of securely doubling the range of single-photon based QKD schemes, in releasing all constraints of the relaying node. Section VIII develops the Quantum Untrusted Relay (QUR) model that is capable of securely distributing shared keys over arbitrarily long distances, in releasing all constraints of relaying nodes. We conclude in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION

Related work.
Since the range of QKD is limited, QKD relaying methods are necessary. This becomes indispensable when one aims at building QKD networks as in the last recent years. All QKD relaying methods so far introduce some undesirable drawbacks. The most practical method is based on trusted model. This method has been applied in two famous QKD networks, DAPRA and SECOCQ 11, 12, 13, 14 . In this method, all the relaying nodes must be assumed perfectly secured. Such an assumption is critical since passive attacks or eavesdropping on intermediate nodes are very difficult to detect. A few number of intermediate nodes could
lead to a great vulnerability in practice. Consequently, one wants to limit the number of trusted nodes in QKD networks.
One could claim that the idea of the quasi-trusted QKD relaying model is not new. The works in 15, 16, 17 were indeed based on such an idea. However, the "quasi-trusted" property was characterized differently and had been analyzed in a different context: each node was assumed to be trusted with a high probability p ∼ 1, and the main focus was the security behavior of the global system that consists of a great number of nodes. In this paper, we propose a very different concept of "quasi-trusted" that is characterized by: (i) being honest enough to correctly follow a given multi-party finite-time communication protocol;
(ii) however, being under the monitoring of eavesdroppers.
Theoretically, the most strong QKD relaying model so far is the one that is based on entanglement swapping (QS) operation 1,2,3 . This QS-based relaying model allows to achieve an arbitrarily long-distance QKD. The idea is roughly described as follows. One first incrementally build a more long distance EPR pair from two less long distance EPR pairs by a number of complicated quantum operations as entanglement purification, entanglement swapping, etc. The goal of this step is to create EPR pairs shared between the two target nodes (origin and destination) that are in an arbitrarily long distance far away. Then, these two nodes could do an entanglement-based BB84 protocol to establish the secret key.
Besides the capacity over arbitrarily long distances, another advantage of the QS-based relaying model is that this model allows to effectively detect eavesdropping at relaying nodes.
Indeed, this model could be considered as untrusted-model.
Motivation.
Although the QS-based relaying model gives a very beautiful result in theory, working on entangled photons is not easy in practice. In compared with single-photon approaches, entanglement-based ones seem to be surcharged by the quickly unavoidable decoherence of entangled photons over transmission and in time. This fact encourages us looking for new relaying methods that restrict the use of entangled photons, or at least effectively decrease the time conserving entangled photons to get more easy in practical implementations. 
III. BACKGROUND
We remind some background concepts and make some propositions that are used to build our four models in the rest of this paper.
A. The controlled-NOT (C-NOT) gate |y |x ⊕ y |x |x Our models need use the quantum controlled-NOT (C-NOT) gate (see Fig.1 ). The BB84 protocol does not need use this gate, however, entanglement swapping and entanglement purification operation require this gate 18, 19 . In fact, the C-NOT gate is one of the most popular two-qubit quantum gates 20, 21 . Without loss of generality, we will work only with the C-NOT gate that operates in basis |+ with two corresponding basis states |0 and |1 .
By definition, this gate flips the second (target) qubit if the first (control) qubit is |1 and does nothing if the control qubit is |0 . 
Obviously, the XOR appears at the second output for the case of the input basis being |+ , exactly as described in Fig. 1 .
We now observe the case in which two input qubits are in basis |× .
We realize that the C-NOT gate now changes the roles of two input qubits. If the second qubit is 1 L (in basis |× ) then it flips the first qubit (in basis |× ). Otherwise, it does nothing. The XOR (in basis |× ) is at the first output in this case, not as described in Fig. 1 Proposition 2. 
Obviously, the output is an entanglement, more precisely, one of four Bell states if the first and second qubits are in basis |× and |+ , respectively.
If the control and target qubits are the basis states in basis |+ and |× , respectively, then we have:
Obviously, the C-NOT does nothing in this case. In fact, we use the C-NOT gate to build a simple quantum circuit as described in Fig. 2 .
It has two inputs and two outputs. The two input qubits first pass through a C-NOT gate operating in basis |+ , and then are measured independently by two quantum detectors that operate in different basis |× and |+ (see Fig. 2 ). The two outputs are classical bits 0 or 1. We can directly deduce from Proposition 1 to the following proposition. 
. If Alice and Bob measure their qubits in any common basis at their spatially separated sites, then Alice will get a random logical output either 0 L or 1 L with each probability of 50% and the output of Bob is always parallel with that of Alice (i.e. the same value).
If we focus on the logical values then we could describe four Bell states that form an orthogonal basis for the quantum state of two qubits as follows:
IV. QUANTUM QUASI-TRUSTED (QQT) RELAYS
Let us observe a three-party communication scenario as follows. The origin Alice wants to establish a secret key with the destination Bob. They want to achieve unconditional security. However, the distance between them exceeds the limited range of QKD. 
Under eavesdropping: The relay could be always under the monitoring of eavesdroppers.
Our quasi-trusted relay definition is simple but very important since we will use it to build the Quantum Quasi-Trusted Bridge (QQTB) and Quantum Quasi-Trusted Relay (QQTR) models in the next of this paper.
V. QUANTUM QUASI-TRUSTED BRIDGE (QQTB) MODEL
A. Description
Definition 2 (QQTB model). The QQT-bridge (QQTB) model is a three-party communication model in which the QQT relay Carol acts as a bridge that helps two long-distance nodes
Alice and Bob to securely establish a shared key. The Fig. 3 roughly describes a QQTB model.
The QQTB model uses an implicit assumption that Eve cannot eavesdrop the origin Alice and the destination Bob. Such a assumption is trivial since if the origin or the destination is eavesdropped then there is no solution for Alice and Bob. Our definition of the QQTB model also implies that Eve is allowed to execute classical and quantum attacks over the channels Alice-Carol and Carol-Bob, even over Carol's site. At the first glance, we realize that the most dangerous vulnerability is from the Carol's site. Indeed, although the two channels
Alice-Carol and Carol-Bob could be secured by QKD (see Fig 3) , if information appears in clear at the Carol's site then Eve could get it without leaving any trace by eavesdropping. 
B. Protocols
The problem is how we could design secure three-party communication protocols that satisfy the constraints of the QQTB model, implicitly, that hold the conditions of the QQT relay (see Definition 1). We develop a simple idea that is based on the one-time pad unbreakable encryption scheme. The idea could be described as follows. We try to create the situation in which Alice, Carol and Bob own three pads A, C, B, respectively. These pads hold C = A ⊕ B (a bit-wise XOR operation). Note that Carol owns C and knows no more than C = A ⊕ B. When Alice wants to send to Bob a secret key K, she sends K ⊕ A to Carol. Carol receives K ⊕ A, computes K ⊕ A ⊕ C = K ⊕ B, and sends the result to Bob. Bob receives K ⊕ B, computes K ⊕ B ⊕ B to obtain K. In such a situation, even though Carol owns C = A ⊕ B, she cannot reveal K. Besides, the key K is unconditional secured over channel since we use the one-time pad scheme. Obviously, Carol holds the under eavesdropping condition (see Definition 1) and could be developed to become a QQT bridge.
We will begin with a classical protocol that illustrates our approach. This protocol is not secure. Then we turn into quantum world to see how quantum mechanics could help.
The Insecure Quasi-Trusted Bridge (IQTB) protocol:
The protocol consists of the following steps. 
Transmitting the secret key:
• Alice randomly creates the m-bit key K, sends K ⊕ A to Carol.
• Carol receives K ⊕ A, computes K ⊕ A ⊕ C = K ⊕ B, then sends the result to Bob.
• Bob receives K ⊕ B, computes K ⊕ B ⊕ B to obtain K.
What is insecure in this protocol? The step 4 seems helpful in face with the finite-time trusted condition of the quasi-trusted bridge: after having done the protocol, even though Carol is corrupted the key K is not compromised. But this is not so! Nobody can sure that in the one hand Carol still does correctly the protocol but in the other hand she makes copies of A and B, maybe only for her curiousness purpose. And then, when the protocol has been yet finished, she could be corrupted and gives these copies to Eve. Consequently, the key K is compromised. More seriously, the protocol cannot hold the under-eavesdropping condition (see Definition 1). Indeed, if Eve could monitor Carol's memory devices, then she can make herself copies of A and B. If A or B is compromised then the key K is compromised, consequently. Now, we propose the Quantum Quasi-Trusted Bridge (QQTB) protocols that really help Alice and Bob to securely establish the shared key K through the bridge Carol. These protocols could defeat drawbacks of the previous protocol.
The Quantum Quasi-Trusted Bridge (QQTB) Protocol:
The protocol consists of 4 main steps.
Step 1: Preparing, exchanging, and measuring qubits. • In the CM, Carol measures independently both |a i and |b i in a randomly chosen basis |+ or |× . She gathers both two resulting bits and keeps track of their corresponding basis. Note that in this mode Carol does not use the quantum circuit described as Fig. 2. • In the MM, Carol first leads |a i , |b i to two inputs of a C-NOT gate, and then measures the two outputs in two different basis: the first one in |× and the second one in |+ as described in Fig. 2 . She randomly chooses one out of two outputs to keep the measured value and the corresponding basis. She discards the another one.
At the end of the receiving process, the CM and MM's choices roughly result in two n-position strings: the check-position string CP = cp 1 , .., cp n and the message-position string MP = mp 1 , .., mp n .
Step 2: Checking for the presence of Eve. values agree, they conclude that the channel was compromised. In this case, they inform to Alice to abort the whole protocol.
Step 3: Creating the pads for Alice, Carol and Bob. 
Step 4: Transmitting the key K.
1. Alice creates the random m-bit key K. She sends K ⊕ A to Carol.
2. Carol receives from Alice K ⊕ A, does a XOR operation over it and her pad, then sends the result to Bob. Since C = A ⊕ B, the result of the XOR operation is
3. Bob receives K ⊕ B, computes K ⊕ B ⊕ B to obtain K.
We show now why this protocol is secure. At the step 1, when a pair (|a i , |b i ) synchronously arrives to Carol, she randomly turns into either the Check-Mode (CM) or the Message-Mode (MM). Since Eve does not know in advance the choices of Carol, she cannot treat differently the pairs (|a i , |b i ). Therefore, the error-rate on the check bits must behave like that on the message bits. In the other hand, the error-check procedures in the channels (Alice, Carol) and (Carol, Bob) are done exactly as that of the BB84 protocol. By that, the QQTB protocol's security is exactly the security of the BB84 protocol. This implies that the QQTB protocol is unconditionally secure. Readers being interested in security proof of BB84 are invited to read 5, 6, 7, 8 .
One can claim that Carol could unintentionally select some choices of CM or MM before arrivals of (|a i , |b i ). If Eve knows these choices by eavesdropping, then she avoids the pairs in CM and attacks on the pairs in MM. This makes security compromised. We propose another protocol that can tolerate such a mistake of Carol.
The modified-QQTB Protocol:
The protocol consists of 5 main steps.
Step 1: Preparing, exchanging, and measuring qubits. 3. Carol receives two 2n-qubit strings from Alice and Bob in a synchronous manner. It means that she receives one by one for 2n pairs (|a i , |b i ). For each pair, Carol first leads |a i , |b i to the C-NOT gate and then measures two output qubits in two different basis: the first one in |× and the second one in |+ as described in Fig. 2 . Then, she randomly chooses one out of two outputs to keep the measured value and the corresponding basis. She discards the other one.
Step 2: Sifting. Step 3: Checking for the presence of Eve. Step 4: Creating the pads for Alice, Carol and Bob.
1. The values in m message-positions result in three m-bit pads A = A 1 , .., A m ; C = C 1 , .., C m ; B = B 1 , .., B m for Alice, Carol and Bob, respectively. These pads hold
Step 5: Transmitting the key K.
2. Carol receives K ⊕ A from Alice, does a XOR operation over it and her pad, then sends the result to Bob. Since C = A ⊕ B, the result of the XOR operation is
This protocol makes sure that measurements are done before check-position and messageposition choices. The classical information that could be eavesdropped by Eve on the Carol site now does not reveal any information of K. We must show that the protocol is secure in faced against Eve's attacks over channel. From our three-party communication model, we build a virtual two-party communication between Anna and Borris in which:
1. Anna plays the roles of both Alice and Bob.
2. Borris plays the role of Carol.
The virtual channel between Anna and Borris consists of both two real channels (Alice,
Carol) and (Carol, Bob).
Let Anna and Borris do our modified QQTB protocol. We realize that Anna and Borris do a variant of the BB84 protocol that takes the same principles. Anna codes a classical bit by non-orthogonal quantum states |q 1 |q 2 , where |q 1 , |q 2 are simultaneously in basis |+ or |× . Borris receives a classical bit by measuring |q 1 ⊕ q 2 in a random basis |+ or |× . If his basis choice is right then the receiving value is exactly q 1 ⊕ q 2 . Otherwise, the receiving bit has a probability of 50% to be right. Eve cannot attack such a conjugate code without introducing more disturbances over channel. By estimating the disturbance, we could detect the presence of Eve over the virtual channel. This implies that we can make sure either the channels (Alice, Carol) and (Carol, Bob) are attacked or not as in the BB84
protocol. In other words, our modified QQTB protocol is unconditionally secure. Readers being interested in security proof of BB84 are invited to read 5,6,7,8 .
The enhanced-QQTB Protocol:
In the modified-QQTB, we realize that if Alice and Bob use a common basis at the position i, then the quantum circuit at the Carol site gives no more information than the logical XOR of two logical values of Alice and Bob. Therefore, no need to force Carol randomly choosing to keep one output (one measuring basis) before Alice and Bob announcing publicly their basis. The enhanced-QQTB protocol is very similar to the modified-QQTB ond. But it could improve the secret-bit rate up to two times.
The enhanced QQTB consists of 5 steps.
Step 1: Preparing, exchanging, and measuring qubits.
• Alice, Carol, Bob do as in the modified QQTB protocol. However, instead of keeping only one output, Carol keeps informations of both two outputs.
Step 2: Sifting.
• Alice and Bob announce their basis: if the basis are different at the position i, then Alice, Bob, and Carol discard the position i.
• For each remaining position i, Carol keeps only informations (value and basis) of either the first output or the second one if the common basis used by Alice and Bob is |× or |+ , respectively. She discards informations of the other one.
• Now, the values of the remaining positions result in three 2m-bit strings a = a 1 , .., a 2m ; c = c 1 , .., c 2m ; b = b 1 , .., b 2m for Alice, Carol and Bob, respectively. Theoretically, these three strings hold
Step 3: Checking for the presence of Eve.
• Alice, Carol, and Bob do exactly as in the modified QQTB protocol.
Step 4: Creating the pads for Alice, Carol and Bob.
Note that the security of enhanced QQTB protocol is exactly that of the modified QQTB protocol since the quantum circuit at the Carol site reveals no more than the XOR result and the qubit measurements are always done before Alice and Bob revealing theirs basis.
Eve always deals with unknown states as in the modified-QQTB protocol. Therefore, the enhanced-QQTB protocol also gives unconditional security. However, the number of secret bits obtained from the enhanced QQTB protocol is two time bigger than that of the modified QQTB protocol (see m in the step 2).
VI. QUANTUM QUASI-TRUSTED RELAY (QQTR) MODEL
A. Is is possible to extend QQTB model over arbitrarily long distance?
The information theory states that Alice and Bob cannot publicly agree a common secret unless they pre-possess a secret key that has the length at least equal to that of the secret 22 .
The quantum mechanic opens a new door that allows Alice and Bob to achieve their goal.
Indeed, the quantum no-cloning theorem states that it is impossible to make a perfect copy of un unknown quantum state. This implies that eavesdropping on quantum channels will introduce some detectable disturbance. By estimating the error rates, Alice and Bob can effectively detect the presence of the eavesdropper Eve.
In this paper, we study quantum models that work with perfect quantum devices, quantum free-error channels, and without quantum memory devices. Note that although the quantum channels are assumed free-error, we should take into account the degradations of single-photon energy and entangled-photon coherence over transmission. We assume that We take into account EPR pairs to build our QQTR model. As mentioned in Section II, we try to limit the time keeping EPR pairs to avoid difficulties arising from entanglement decoherence. Such a motivation makes our works distinguished from the works presented
The QQTR model is roughly described as Fig.4 . 
QQTR protocol.
Between Alice and Bob we arrange N Carols (C 1 , .., C N for short) and N + 1 Bells (B 1 , .., B N +1 for short) as described in Fig.4 . This creates 2N + 2 segments. Without loss of generality, we assume that the length of segments are the same and the segment length allows our quantum devices working correctly and effectively on entanglement coherence and single-photon detection.
Our QQTR protocol consists of 5 steps:
1. For B 1 , .., B N +1 , each prepares n Bell states (|Φ + ) n .
2. B 1 sends the first half of each Bell state to Alice (the previous), the second half to C 1 (the next). B N +1 sends the first half of each Bell state to C N (the previous), the second half to Bob (the next). For i ∈ [2, N], B i sends the first half of each Bell state to C i−1 (the previous), the second half to C i (the next).
Each
, receives 2n qubits from B i and B i+1 in a synchronous manner. This means that she receives n times, and for each time she leads the qubit from B i and the qubit from B i+1 to the first and second inputs of the quantum circuit as described in Fig. 2 . Then, she keeps informations (the measured value and the corresponding basis) of both two outputs. Briefly, C i acts exactly as Carol in the enhanced-QQTB protocol.
4. Alice and Bob receive n qubits for each one. They randomly choose basis to measure their qubits, independently.
1. Alice and Bob announce their n basis used. respectively. These N + 2 strings should hold
Step 3: Checking for the presence of Eve. Step 4: Creating the pads for Alice, C 1 , .., C N , and Bob.
1. The values in m message-positions result in N + 2 m-bit pads
for Alice, C 1 , .., C N , and Bob, respectively. These pads hold
1. Alice creates the random m-bit key K, m ∼ n 4
. She sends K ⊕ P A to C 1 .
For
, does a XOR operation over it and her pad, then sends the result to C i+1 .
, does a XOR operation over it and her pad, then sends the result to Bob
C. Correctness and security
Correctness.
One could claim that is it true that
in the step 2 (sifting) of the QQTR protocol?
We first look at 5 sites: Alice, B 1 , C 1 , B 2 , C 2 . We focus on the effect of the quantum circuit (see Fig. 2 ) on the site C 1 . This circuit acts on |Φ This implies that C 1 , as all C 2 , .., C N , keep the result of the second output, and discard the first output of the quantum circuit. When the qubits 2, 3 go through the C-NOT gate, we have: (|01 01| + |10 10|) that has the logical parity either 0 or 1, respectively.
Therefore, when the quantum circuit of C 1 has finished, we have a situation that could be described as follows. We denote the qubits 1, 4 by |a and |x 1 , respectively. Alice owns |a . The qubit |x 1 is transmitted to C 2 to enter, as the first input, into the quantum circuit at C 2 . C 1 owns a classical bit c(1) that hold c(1) = a ⊕ x 1 provided that |a and |x 1 are measured afterward in |+ . We now observe the quantum circuit at C 2 .
After measurements are done at the two outputs, we have the following situation. We denote the remaining half of the EPR pair (the qubit 6) by |x 2 . |x 2 is transmitted to C 3 .
C 1 owns the classical value c(2) that holds c(2) = x 1 ⊕ x 2 since the qubits 5, 6 are parallel.
The quantum circuits at the sites C 3 to C N do similarly as that at C 2 . This results in:
Note that Bob owns |x N = |b . Finally, when Alice and Bob measure their qubits, we have:
Security.
We distinguish possible attack types of Eve. perfect EPR sources by executing random-hashing verification schemes. As a result, we could conclude that our QQTR protocol is secure faced to this attack type.
As Carol in the enhanced-QQTB protocol, C 1 , .., C N reveal no information than the XOR results. Their choices of the first or the second output depend on the randomness of the basis choices of Alice and Bob. This implies that all the single states (qubits) in the channels (attack type 3) and the C 1 , .., C N (attack type 2) are unknown states for Eve. By the nocloning theorem, Eve will make additional disturbances if she attacks on these states. In the step 3 of the QQTR protocol, we check the presence of Eve as the checking scheme of the enhanced-QQTB protocol. Therefore, we could conclude that our QQTR protocol is secure face to the attack types 2 and 3.
Our protocol also is secure with the attack type 4 since the classical values a, b were not revealed outside of Alice and Bob. The knowledge of c(1), .., c(N) cannot deduce exactly the values of a, b. Here, we can say that the main idea of the QQTR protocol is exactly that of the single-photon QQTB protocols. This is the spirit of our "quasi-trusted" model.
VII. QUANTUM UNTRUSTED BRIDGE (QUB) MODEL
Model description.
The QUB model is very similar to the QQTB one (see Section V. However, in this model we release the "finite-time trusted" condition of the intermediate node Carol. Instead, we require that Alice and Bob must effectively detect the case in which Carol tries to cheat.
This implies that Eve could have full control on the Carol site or in the other word she plays the role of Carol (see Fig. 5 ). We must design a protocol that allows Alice and Bob to effectively detect to discard the cases in which Eve does not correctly follow the protocol and tries to read the transmitting keys.
Bob Alice Eve. This implies that they must effectively detect to discard the cases in which Eve tries to read the transmitting keys.
The QUB protocol.
Step 1: Preparing, exchanging, and measuring qubits. Step 3: Checking for the presence of Eve. Step 4: Creating the pads for Alice, Bob. Step 5: Transmitting the key K.
Alice creates the random
2. Bob receives K ⊕ B, computes K ⊕ B ⊕ B to obtain K.
Security.
Note that the quantum circuit of Carol gives no more information than one XOR result either in basis |+ or |× , appearing at the second output or the first one, depending on the common basis of Alice and Bob being |+ or |× , respectively. In the modified-QQTB and enhanced-QQTB protocols, since Carol participates in the check process, she could cheat Alice and Bob. In the QUB protocol, Carol must announce her values before she knows the choices of basis of Alice and Bob. This implies that the quantum states of Alice and Bob are really unknown to Carol. If she does not correctly follow the protocol, then her measured values must introduce some more errors. Note that Carol must always introduce one correct XOR result of two unknown states came from Alice and Bob, provided the Alice and Bob's choices of basis is the same. This allows the step 3 of the protocol effectively detect malicious operations of Carol.
VIII. QUANTUM UNTRUSTED RELAY (QUR) MODEL
Model description.
The QUR model is very similar to the QQTR one (see Section VI). However, this model releases the "finite-time trusted" condition of the intermediate nodes Carol. Instead, we require that Alice and Bob must effectively detect to discard the cases in which Carol does not correctly follow the protocol and tries to read the transmitting keys. In the other word, the QUR model works with untrusted intermediate nodes.
QQTR protocol.
Between Alice and Bob we arrange N Carols (C 1 , .., C N for short) and N + 1 Bells (B 1 , .., B N +1 for short) as described in Fig.4 . This creates 2N + 2 segments. Without loss of generality, we assume that the length of segments are the same and the segment length allows our quantum devices working correctly and effectively with entanglement coherence and single-photon. All is similar to those of the QQTR model (see Section VI).
The QUR protocol consists of 5 steps:
Step 1: Preparing, exchanging, and measuring qubits. Step 3: Checking for the presence of Eve. Step 4: Creating the pads for Alice and Bob. A , P C(1) , .., P C(N ) and Bob holds N + 1 pads P B , P C(1) , .., P C(N ) . These pads hold N i=1 P C(i) = P A ⊕ P B .
. She sends K ⊕ P A N i=1 P C(i) to Bob.
Bob receives
K ⊕ P A ⊕ N i=1 P C(j) , computes K ⊕ P A ⊕ P B ⊕ N i=1 P C(i) = K.
Correctness.
The QUR protocol is based on the QQTR protocol, therefore, the correctness is exactly the same.
Security.
Note that the random coincidences of basis choices between Alice and Bob determine the computation basis of EPR states. By the fact that C 1 , .., C N must announce their measurement values before they know the basis of Alice and Bob, we have successfully removed the cheating possibility of C 1 , .., C N as analyzed in the security discussion of the QUB protocol. Besides, our check process could also detect imperfect EPR source as that of the modified Lo-Chau BB84 protocol presented in 5 . In brief, our QUT protocol has the same security level as the other EPR pair based BB84 protocol.
IX. CONCLUSION
We developed quasi-trusted and untrusted models for relaying QKD keys. We distinguished protocols that are based on single photon and entangled photons. Our motivation is to avoid difficulties arising from conserving the quantum entanglement that is unavoidable dramatically decreased in time. The heart of our works is the quantum circuit as described as Fig. 2 . This circuit receives two states and gives no more information than the XOR result of two input states, provided that the two input states are prepared in a common
